Chatham house_Abe by Fiori, Antonio
Research Paper
John Nilsson-Wright and Kiichi Fujiwara 
Asia Programme | September 2015
Japan’s Abe Administration
Steering a Course between 
Pragmatism and Extremism
Japan’s Abe Administration: Steering a Course between Pragmatism and Extremism
Summary
• Sympathetic analysts of Japanese politics highlight Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s moderate 
and internationalist posture, emphasizing economic recovery and a pragmatic approach to 
security issues. By contrast, his critics focus on the fear that Abe’s instinctive stance is one of 
uncompromising conservative nationalism, including historical revisionism.
• In his first few months in office, Abe adopted a cautious approach, concentrating on delivering 
his campaign’s economic promises. However, in late 2013 his visit to the Yasukuni shrine and a 
cabinet reshuffle hinted at a move towards a more controversial agenda.
• The ‘Abe doctrine’, set out in a speech by the prime minister on 18 January 2013, explicitly refers 
to democratic norms and values, placing Japan in the community of law-abiding democracies and 
pointing to its similarities with the West, including a commitment to international cooperation 
and the rule of law. This doctrine is part of an effort to mark China as the odd man out in the 
international community.
• By promoting Japan’s new security legislation to allow a broader interpretation of the country’s 
right to ‘collective self-defence’, Abe’s government is attempting to convince the public that 
these reforms are essential to protect Japan. But critics are suspicious that they are a back-door 
route to more wide-ranging constitutional change and a de facto revision of Japan’s alliance 
relationship with the United States.
• Opinion polls are showing a sharp dip in the popularity of the government, which may find it 
politic to maintain its initial pragmatic foreign policy posture, avoiding any statements that 
could potentially be interpreted as an endorsement of Japan’s past wartime actions. Sustaining 
broad popular agreement appears to be essential for promoting the security revisions that are 
arguably vital to Japan’s long-term strategic and national interests.
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Introduction
Nearly three years have passed since Shinzo Abe was re-elected as Japan’s prime minister in 
December 2012. In contrast to his first term in office, which ended abruptly after a year in 2007, 
Abe’s second term has lasted longer than that of any other prime minister since Jun’ichiro Koizumi 
(2001–06). This is a major achievement considering that his predecessors had averaged at best a year 
in office. With economic recovery and political stability, Abe certainly seems to have put Japan back 
on the geopolitical map and to have presented a revitalized image of strong and authoritative prime 
ministerial leadership.
Perceptions of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration have remained divided, 
however, both at home and abroad. Two sharply polarized views exist among current watchers 
of the Japanese political scene. Sympathetic observers might be inclined to stress the importance 
of setting aside historical issues for the moment, in favour of focusing on positive economic 
developments. This view highlights the sudden revival of the Japanese economy after two decades 
of stagnation, as reflected in the rise of the Nikkei from 8,434.61 to 19,000 over the course of five 
months (November 2012–March 2013),1 along with a stable political environment underpinned 
by the continuity of the Abe cabinet. In contrast to the confusion that characterized a series of 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) governments from 2009 to 2012 (under a succession of prime 
ministers – Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda), where politics was chaotic and 
the economy still struggling, the Abe government has taken a strong lead in tackling a range of 
contentious issues while displaying a deft and pragmatic touch in the implementation of new 
policies, especially in the security sphere. For its supporters, this is an administration that, after 
some twenty years, has brought back economic growth and political stability to Japan, that has 
remained resolute in the face of an emerging geopolitical challenge from China and that will, 
in the future, restore the pride and glory that the Japanese nation deserves.
More critical observers might seek to set aside the question of ‘Abenomics’ and the economy, 
concentrating instead on how the government has promoted historical revisionism, as evidenced 
in the prime minister’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine2 in December 2013, along with 
pronouncements that appear to have whitewashed or rationalized Japanese military adventures 
before and during the Second World War. Such critics would probably take issue with the lack of 
attention to press freedom, and alleged indirect efforts to exert vague but persistent pressure against 
political opinions in newspapers or on television that are critical of the government. Recent efforts 
to promote new legislation enacting more ambitious security provisions in the Diet (the Japanese 
parliament) have generated fresh controversy. Critics see this as a threat to the country’s long-
standing constitutional provisions, and Abe’s policies as a direct attempt to overturn the norms 
and values of the liberal political postwar order – measures that risk eventually embroiling Japan 
in a future regional war.
Attitudes towards the current government, particularly in the context of its foreign and security 
policies and the issue of constitutional revision, tend to be concentrated around these two extremes, 
1 Atsushi Kodera, ‘Inflation eludes, stock rise helps few, but yen’s fall hurts many’, Japan Times, 3 April 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/04/03/business/economy-business/inflation-eludes-stock-rise-helps-yens-fall-hurts-many/#.VdWVbX1UU3A.
2 Abe’s decision to visit Yasukuni was highly controversial outside Japan, not only in China and South Korea where the legacy of Japan’s colonial 
rule during the 1930s remains acutely sensitive, but also in the United States. Senior US government officials, including Vice-President Joe Biden, 
had called in advance for moderation on difficult historical issues, and following the visit, the US embassy in Tokyo took the unprecedented step 
of releasing a public statement noting that the US government was ‘disappointed’ by Abe’s actions. See ‘Abe grossly misjudged US reaction before 
making Yasukuni visit’, Asahi Shimbun, 28 December 2013.
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with little common ground. To explain the evolution of these two contrasting and seemingly 
contradictory perceptions, this paper explores the historical background and various aspects 
of the Abe administration’s outlook.
A moderate conservative?
The second Abe cabinet was formed after three years of DPJ government (the first non-LDP 
government since 1996), which were erratic and uncoordinated, frequently bedevilled by divisive, 
internal factionalism, and associated with a catalogue of errors and uncosted promises. Prime 
Minister Hatoyama’s mishandling of the relocation of the Futenma US military base in Okinawa, 
as well as Kan’s seeming inability to coordinate adequate crisis management in the face of Japan’s 
triple disaster of a major earthquake, devastating tsunami and meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear 
plant, exhausted whatever political capital might have accompanied the DPJ victory in 2009. Voter 
disaffection and no-confidence votes in the Diet led to a landslide victory by the LDP at the general 
election of December 2012.
The LDP leadership was well aware that the election was more a vote against the DPJ than a 
positive endorsement of its own party. Abe was clearly determined to make his second term more 
successful and stable than his first. He appointed the leaders of the key powerful factions within the 
LDP as a means of creating a strong and unified government. This was a well-balanced cabinet, with 
an emphasis on inclusivity and experience, and without any clear ideological messages. Although vocal 
conservatives such as Tomomi Inada (Regulatory Reform) or Hakubun Shimomura (Education) were 
represented, as well as Taro Aso (Finance), so too were moderates such as Fumio Kishida (Foreign 
Affairs) and Sadakazu Tanigaki (Justice). The only leading personality not included in the cabinet 
was Shigeru Ishiba, Abe’s long-standing political rival, a former minister of defence and a leading 
security specialist with a reputation for supporting a revisionist political agenda. However, Ishiba 
was appointed to the key position as LDP secretary-general, with key responsibility for running the 
party’s election campaigns. Overall, the 2012 cabinet was an all-star game for the party, intended 
to avoid any repeat of the miserable defeat in 2009 and designed to cement and to hold on to 
political power for as long as possible.
This representation of many factions in the cabinet is essential to an understanding of the current 
government. Historically, the LDP has been more of a loose coalition of conservative parties than a 
coherent political body with a command centre. In contrast, for example, to the ideologically distinctive 
Labour and Conservative parties at the heart of post-1945 UK politics, the LDP has, since its formation 
in 1955, been a broad and inclusive political church, united less by ideology than by the single-minded 
goal of winning elections. Other than during the period between 1945 and 1960, when Japanese 
politics was dominated by contentious issues associated with constitutional revision and alignment 
with the United States within the Cold War, political success in Japan has been a function of policy 
pragmatism and the ability to deliver economic prosperity.
Party politicians in Japan, whether in the LDP or in the leading opposition parties, such as the 
Japan Socialist Party or DPJ, have often positioned themselves along two separate and distinct 
political axes: an economic policy spectrum stretching from a small-state, neoliberal approach to 
a more interventionist model of paternalistic government interventionism; and a foreign policy 
spectrum ranging from security cooperation centred on the US–Japan alliance to a more explicitly 
internationalist approach focused on the United Nations. Mapping an individual politician’s policy 
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preferences against these two spectrums can provide a guide to his or her ideological preferences 
that is often independent of the policy priorities of the party to which he or she belongs.
It was the mainstream conservatives, or Hoshu Honryu, who dominated LDP politics from the 
1960s to 1980s; their main concern was economic growth, and they were content to leave the national 
security agenda in the hands of the United States. The factions that composed Hoshu Honryu were, 
however, severely damaged in 1993 when a number of young political leaders (most prominently 
Ichiro Ozawa and Tsutomu Hata) defected from the largest Takeshita3 faction (Keiseikai) and formed 
a new party (the Japan Renewal Party, or Shinseito), leading to the LDP losing its majority in the 
election that year. With the Takeshita faction in disarray, the Seiwa Policy Research Council (Seiwa 
Seisaku Kenyukai, or Seiwakai), a faction that had occupied a permanent number two, if not number 
three, position, suddenly emerged as the front runner. It was the Seiwakai that, after gaining power, 
provided future candidates for prime minister, including Yoshiro Mori, Koizumi and Abe.
If the Seiwakai were to overplay its cards, however, rival factions would form an alliance and 
challenge the political leadership, and it would take an audacious and tactically agile leader (such 
as Koizumi) to overcome such opposition.4 Maintaining factional balance has been a hallmark of a 
successful and stable LDP throughout much of its postwar history. Indeed, it was in part the failure of 
Abe’s grandfather, former prime minister Nobusuke Kishi, to include a broad spectrum of conservative 
politicians within his own cabinet in the late 1950s that ultimately led to an internal party rebellion, 
forcing him to step down as premier in 1960. It would be surprising if Abe had not taken this bitter 
lesson to heart. Moreover, in 2012 all factions were in a cooperative mood, committed to launch a 
strong administration that would offset challenges from the opposition parties and aware that any 
internal divisions would be exploited by their adversaries. As noted above, the first Abe cabinet was 
more an LDP than an Abe cabinet; the government focused on economic recovery rather than national 
security or constitutional revision, even though Abe himself had long been viewed as one of the party’s 
more conservative members. In contrast to 2006–07, when he had devoted much of his energy to 
controversial issues, including constitutional reform, Abe played it safe and in his first few months 
in office sought to concentrate on delivering on his campaign’s economic promises.5
A moderate cabinet led by Shinzo Abe must have surprised observers both within and outside Japan. 
Belying the two-dimensional image of a historical revisionist, Abe eschewed inflammatory statements 
and seldom referred to the history issue. Indeed, judged at face value, his general approach was 
conciliatory and consistent with earlier statements by his predecessors. Specifically, he agreed 
to endorse two key public statements by previous Japanese prime ministers recognizing Japan’s 
wartime responsibilities. One was the Kono statement of 1993, issued by then chief cabinet secretary 
3 Noboru Takeshita served as prime minister of Japan from 1987 to 1990, and for much of his career as a senior politician was head of the largest 
faction in the LDP. Takeshita took on his role as faction chief from an earlier prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, a classic ‘machine politician’ who 
used a generous system of financial incentives and pork-barrel politics to dominate the leadership of the LDP and to control an electoral process 
that underpinned much of the political ascendancy of the LDP in the postwar period.
4 Koizumi’s chosen strategy for maintaining his political support was to define himself explicitly as an ‘anti-LDP’ LDP politician, frequently 
appealing directly to the Japanese public over the heads of his party rivals in an effort to bolster his legitimacy and secure critically important 
negotiating room. Coming from a numerically small political faction, Koizumi had been elected as LDP president in 2001 with the support of 
younger and local prefectural party members, at a time of existential crisis within the LDP, in response to the policy failures of a hugely unpopular 
Mori government. Astute and skilful in using the bully pulpit of high-profile television appearances, Koizumi cleverly adopted a public gambit of 
threatening to destroy the LDP if his policies of economic reform, deregulation and postal privatization were not adopted by the party.
5 The 2012 election campaign had been dominated by economic issues, with an electorate seemingly little interested in questions of foreign 
policy or security that have over time become more central to political debate both in Japan and internationally. As a prospective LDP 
presidential candidate in 2006, Abe had set out his more ambitious ideas for restoring pride in Japan and the need to engage with difficult 
historical issues from a revisionist perspective in a personal manifesto entitled Utsukushii Nihon e (Towards a Beautiful Japan). But Abe had 
learnt from his first term in office that front-loading controversial constitutional issues or topics related to national identity had cost him 
critically important public support.
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Yohei Kono, acknowledging that the Japanese military had been involved in the management of 
so-called ‘comfort stations’ – wartime brothels established to cater for Japanese troops, and facilitating 
the forcible recruitment of Korean and other Asian women into prostitution for the Japanese military. 
The other was the 1995 statement issued by then prime minister Tomiichi Murayama in which he 
expressed his ‘deep remorse’ and ‘heartfelt apology’ for Japan’s actions during the 1930s. Both the 
Kono and Murayama statements have been opposed by the extreme right in Japan, and Abe’s position 
on these suggested two possible goals: either a desire to plant himself securely on the middle ground 
of mainstream political consensus within Japan; or a deliberate strategy of prioritization – addressing 
key economic issues of concern to the electorate, while hoping to secure more seats for LDP candidates 
in the upper house elections of 2013 and thus, in turn, to buy political space to focus on more 
contentious security and constitutional issues later in his political term.6
Alongside the issue of identity politics, Abe also adopted a moderate position towards Japan’s 
immediate neighbours, or at the very least sought to avoid exacerbating already fraught relations 
with other countries in Northeast Asia. Chinese military actions in the neighbouring seas around 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (the source of a long-running territorial dispute between China and 
Japan) had become increasingly menacing after 2012. But instead of relying on a naked nationalistic 
outburst against China, Abe chose to represent his country as democratic and law-abiding, just like 
its Western allies, making it easier for the US and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
members to align themselves with Japan. This image of moderation was extremely successful: 
in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and in effect everywhere Abe visited and 
made impressive speeches, his government was hailed as one with which it was possible to share 
values and do business, and not as a monster of historical revisionism eager to assert its political 
will and project its power towards its neighbours.7
In the cabinet reshuffle in December 2014, moderate leaders such as Tanigaki 
were replaced, leaving the impression that the LDP cabinet was becoming 
less eclectic and increasingly dominated by politicians supportive of a more 
hardline agenda.
There were, however, cracks in the façade. After about a year of moderate political leadership, Abe 
visited the Yasukuni shrine in late 2013 (in direct contravention of advice from senior US government 
officials), reviving fears that he might be sympathetic to historical revisionism. In the cabinet reshuffle 
in December 2014, moderate leaders such as Tanigaki were replaced, leaving the impression that 
the LDP cabinet was becoming less eclectic and increasingly dominated by politicians supportive of 
a more hardline agenda. New, more assertive defence legislation, and especially provisions intended 
to tighten up the rules governing state secrecy, reinforced worries that Abe might be tilting the 
country in an illiberal direction and inclined to ride roughshod over the constitution in favour of new 
interpretations intended to expand Japan’s military operations overseas. The issue here is whether 
6 Abe had given some support for constitutional revision during the upper house election campaign of 2013 – a move that may have been 
motivated by a desire to avoid losing ground to a new rival conservative political grouping, Nippon Ishin no Kai (the Japan Restoration Party), 
that took an unambiguous position in favour of constitutional revision.
7 The circumstances surrounding the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are complex, reflected in the lack of a consensus between the 
Chinese and Japanese governments over the historical details underpinning their respective territorial claims, and compounded by a series of 
recent bilateral clashes. For example, while Chinese incursions into Japan’s maritime waters have become increasingly bold and provocative in 
recent years, the decision by the DPJ government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in September 2012 to nationalize the islands (in an effort to 
block their attempted purchase by the then governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara) prompted a sharp deterioration in relations between Beijing and 
Tokyo. This was a risk which senior US officials had pointed out when privately advising Noda not to push ahead with nationalization.
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Abe can successfully maintain his moderate and internationalist posture, focusing on economic 
recovery and a pragmatic approach to security issues, or whether, as his critics have feared, he 
will openly assert a form of uncompromising conservative nationalism. In this context, the critical 
question revolves around motivation. Does Abe see himself as a consensus politician, able to unite 
the country around widely shared values in the face of new security challenges? Or does his desire 
to lead forcefully place him on a collision course with mainstream public opinion, which remains 
sceptical about new legislative initiatives, both in the security sphere and above all on constitutional 
issues where the prime minister’s basic position may be non-negotiable?
Norms and doctrines
One of the most striking elements of Abe’s approach to foreign affairs since 2012 has been his 
commitment to a punishing schedule of overseas trips. This most peripatetic of premiers visited no 
fewer than 49 countries in under two years. One would naturally expect a Japanese prime minister to 
visit the United States, given the historical importance of the bilateral alliance relationship between 
Tokyo and Washington, but in the case of Abe, he has been to all the member nations of ASEAN, some 
more than once, and has also found time to travel to Africa, the Middle East and Europe. This is in 
remarkable contrast to his immediate predecessors, who rarely stepped outside Japan during their 
(admittedly brief) tenures.
Moreover, Abe has shown himself to be an effective practitioner of public diplomacy, focused 
on engagement and relatively at ease in connecting with foreign audiences. His speeches (often in 
English) have been positively received by politicians and the public abroad. Typically in the past a 
speech made by a Japanese prime minister would be greeted with polite indifference, especially if 
delivered in English that was sometimes hard to comprehend. While his command of English is a little 
hesitant and his presentation can be a little laboured, Abe has made great efforts to focus on reaching 
out to his audiences through clearly articulated English-language addresses. He has not been 
content simply to deliver texts provided by foreign ministry or cabinet officials, but has frequently 
sought to incorporate a personal and often emotionally affecting set of references. In a speech to 
the Australian parliament in July 2014 and in an unprecedented address to a joint session of the 
US Congress in June 2015, this reputedly conservative and hawkish leader opened his remarks by 
highlighting wartime memories and imagery, presented not from the Japanese perspective but from 
that of Australia and the United States. Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that Abe has been 
one of Japan’s most effective communicators abroad. This has probably much to do with the content 
of his speeches, but Abe’s willingness to work hard at presentation (as well as the skill of his speech-
writers) has doubtless been an important factor in winning him plaudits from foreign audiences. One 
has to go back many years, perhaps to the 1980s and the era of Yasuhiro Nakasone, to find a leader 
with a similar commitment to engagement with overseas audiences. Whether attention to detail in 
this fashion is sufficient to dispel doubts in some quarters about aspects of Japan’s approach to both 
regional and historical issues is unclear.
Abe’s arguments in his foreign speeches have been simple, consistent and shaped around a clear 
thesis. The prototype can be seen in the text he prepared for an ASEAN meeting in Jakarta on 
18 January 2013.8 Although the prime minister was unable to deliver the speech, owing to the 
8 ‘The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy’, Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, http://japan.kantei.
go.jp/96_abe/statement/201301/18speech_e.html.
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disruptive influence of a terrorist attack in Algeria that month, involving the capture of a number of 
Japanese hostages, the core message of the text clearly sets out his philosophy – so starkly, in fact, 
that it merits being characterized as the kernel of an ‘Abe doctrine’. The speech represents Japan 
as a land of democracy and the rule of law, where freedom of ideas, expression and speech are 
honoured and valued as in the Western democracies. Indeed, the country’s democratic credentials 
and normative clout as a member of the liberal community are underscored by emphasizing its status 
as the world’s ‘largest maritime democracy’ (sekai saidaino kaiyo minshushugi): as a law-abiding 
nation, Japan belongs to the free world, and is an ally of the United States, which is the world’s largest 
naval and economic power; as a member of the free world, Japan expects other nations to defend 
freedom of speech, observe the rules of maritime law, foster free and open economic relations, and 
encourage communication between different cultures.
Compared with past Japanese prime ministerial statements, this new formulation of national 
goals and aspirations is striking, most notably because of its explicit reference to democratic 
norms and values. The earliest expression of Japan’s post-1945 foreign policy thinking (and 
a reflection of mainstream Japanese conservative thinking), commonly characterized as the 
Yoshida doctrine after former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, focused on economic recovery 
as a top priority, while relying on a permanent US military presence in Japan to achieve a credible 
national defence without excessive financial burdens. Yoshida, in effect, cleverly ceded security 
and defence responsibilities to Washington, to provide space and time for Japan to focus on 
economic recovery and growth. In its grandest and most ambitious formulation (one favoured less 
by Yoshida and more by later politicians and academic observers), Yoshida’s approach evolved 
over time into a fundamental effort to redefine the very essence of the nation-state. To some, 
this took the form of a post-modern identity in which central government happily abandoned 
its monopoly over the use of force in favour of an approach rooted in UN-centred internationalism, 
low-profile diplomacy and a broader commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 
Whether in Yoshida’s original narrow expression of the national interest in the 1940s and 
early 1950s, or in later pragmatic efforts by Japanese leaders to find a place for Japan in both 
the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds, it has been rare to find references to an international 
community of democracy and human rights.
This tendency to shy away from potentially contentious or divisive references to political values 
was also evident in another important attempt to articulate a foreign policy vision for Japan. In this 
instance, the doctrinal formulation was associated with Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in a seminal 
speech he made in Manila in 1977 while on a visit to a number of ASEAN states. This so-called Fukuda 
doctrine was replete with rhetorical references to peace and prosperity, including a ‘peace diplomacy 
oriented toward all directions in the world’, as well as references to Japan’s ‘contribution to the peace 
and prosperity of Southeast Asia on an equal basis’. Strikingly absent from the text were any references 
to democracy or human rights. The omission is understandable, first, because many governments in 
Southeast Asia were authoritarian at the time; and, secondly, because the aim of the Fukuda doctrine 
was to prioritize economic diplomacy (bolstered by Japan’s overseas development aid to developing 
nations) as the second tier of Japan’s foreign policy next to national security. In effect, economic aid 
was to be deployed as a strategic asset, fostering both the stability and the prosperity of vulnerable 
Southeast Asian economies, while also complementing and promoting Japan’s own economic growth 
objectives. References to democracy or human rights were considered unwise and inappropriate when 
providing assistance to authoritarian regimes.
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The Abe doctrine is therefore a major change in Japan’s foreign policy priorities: by placing Japan 
in the community of law-abiding democracies, it seeks to highlight the similarities between Japan 
and Western democracies and the political commonalities underpinning international cooperation 
and the rule of law. It is easy to see why Abe’s speeches were so warmly greeted in the US, Britain 
and Australia. This approach also has an equally important strategic rationale. Focusing on political 
values is an easy and obvious way of highlighting the contrast between Japan and its regional and 
global partners on the one hand, and an authoritarian China on the other. Presenting the leadership 
in Beijing as dismissive of human rights and democratic norms in China, as well as potentially 
aggressive in its development of its military capabilities abroad (whether, in a maritime context, in 
the South or East China Seas or, in the air, through the promotion of an expansive and unilaterally 
announced Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ]) highlights and magnifies the differences between 
China and the rest of the world. China, according to this interpretation, is therefore the odd man out 
in the international community, not Japan.
Calling for international solidarity between the world’s democracies is, however, not the only way 
to confront China. One can easily imagine a more conventional and traditional realpolitik response 
to that country’s rise that focuses on military strategies and the development of a regional arms race 
and a diplomatic campaign to build up new security partnerships intended to offset, if not contain, 
its ambitions. While Japan’s defence community has embraced elements of the latter approach (as 
reflected in a small but steady increase in Japanese defence expenditure over the past three years,9 
as well as new legislative initiatives to boost the country’s defence capabilities and flexibility), Abe’s 
astute stress on values has had the advantage of positioning Japan firmly in the camp of liberal 
internationalist legitimacy. As a corollary it has, in part, helped to insulate Japan from criticism 
that it may be seeking to turn the clock back to the prewar era through the promotion of historical 
revisionism and militaristic policies.
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are limits to the efficacy of this approach, not least 
because the global and regional environment is undergoing considerable change. Extolling the 
virtues of the international liberal regime, with its stress on order and the rule of law, makes sense 
so long as there is a general consensus that this order still prevails. But this assumption is challenged 
by a host of recent developments, including the crisis in Ukraine, the fragmentation of Syria 
and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), China’s increasing economic and political 
influence, the establishment of new institutional structures that depart from the post-1945 Bretton 
Woods consensus – most notably the establishment of the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank 
(AIIB) – and fears of a possible US retreat into isolationism. Japan under Abe may be at risk of being 
behind the geopolitical curve, trying too hard to situate itself in a world that no longer exists, and in 
the process demonstrating a weakness common to many flawed strategic outlooks, namely planning 
for future eventualities on the basis of past, outdated certainties.10
9 ¥4.75 trillion in FY2013, ¥4.88 trillion in FY2014 and ¥4.98 trillion in FY2015. See Defense Budget, Japan’s Ministry of Defense,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/.
10 Henry Kissinger has recently written persuasively about the breakdown of established notions of order, both globally and in East Asia, and the 
need to think creatively and imaginatively about alternative structures. See Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).
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Facing China
What is Abe’s policy towards China? Beijing’s assertive maritime policy in the South China Sea, 
arousing anxiety in Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, predates his election in 2012; Tokyo’s attempt 
to strengthen the US–Japan alliance also dates back to the Kan government.11 Defence cooperation 
with Australia, part of a Japanese strategy of developing (alongside its traditional alliance with the 
United States) new ‘minilateral’ security partnerships with a number of regional actors, was also in 
place long before Abe took office. What, then, is new about his approach?
The first distinctive feature has been the focus on ASEAN members. They stand out in terms 
of the frequency of Abe’s overseas visits, in clear contrast to the DPJ’s virtual neglect of ASEAN as 
a policy priority. The reason for this is obvious. While the US and Australia can provide the muscle 
in terms of military hardware and alliance support to deter China, ASEAN provides critical political 
support and legitimacy to Japan’s efforts to balance against China’s rise. Over the past decade, 
the steady trend has been for ASEAN to accommodate Beijing; if that pattern can be reversed, 
or at the very least slowed down, and if not only Vietnam and the Philippines but all ASEAN 
members begin to express common security concerns over China’s maritime actions, this would 
be a diplomatic achievement that would strengthen Tokyo’s strategic interests and its diplomatic 
clout in the region. 
For now it is unclear how far Abe has succeeded in shifting the political balance in Japan’s 
favour. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have enthusiastically welcomed Tokyo’s approach 
to Southeast Asia (a trend reflected in important new bilateral accords enabling Japan to provide 
much-needed defence equipment to both Hanoi and Manila), Cambodia still appears to favour 
building stronger relations with Beijing. Both Indonesia and Thailand, key members of ASEAN, 
are entangled in domestic political issues that limit their opportunities to take new foreign policy 
initiatives. Moreover, since China is the largest trade partner for all of ASEAN, there is a natural 
reluctance among member states to confront China directly.12 ASEAN, after all, has always sought 
an independent breathing space between China and Japan. Its members certainly do not want to 
be pushed around by China, but nor do they wish to oppose the country’s will. China, moreover, 
is a divisive issue for ASEAN, as the priorities of the member states are different, and ASEAN as 
an organization has sought to avoid issues that will highlight and intensify internal divisions.
One might argue that Abe’s tough policy towards Beijing has actually worked in Japan’s favour. 
After all, China’s leader Xi Jinping agreed to meet Abe at the November 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing; furthermore, both the Japanese and Chinese sides agreed 
four bullet points of agreement shortly before the summit, including a joint commitment on 
maritime safety, while contentious references to the history issue were discreetly elided in the final 
communiqué. This is quite different from an earlier Chinese request that Abe commit to avoiding 
any future visit to Yasukuni as a prerequisite for the summit. In sum, it appeared that Japan had 
11 Indeed, as a number of commentators have noted, Japan’s shift to a more active security stance has evolved steadily and incrementally since 
the ending of the Cold War. This reflects a broad consensus across the political spectrum (recognized by both LDP and DPJ politicians) on the 
importance of enhancing Japan’s defence preparedness in the face of a number of critical security challenges. These include not only a rising 
China, but also the possibility of a nuclearized North Korea and a range of non-traditional security threats, including global terrorism, piracy and 
challenges from separatist and populist movements to the integrity of nation-states in the region. The focus has shifted away from the Cold War 
threat of a Soviet-led assault on the north of Japan towards a consideration of the security challenges to Japan’s southeast, including in particular 
the risk of conflict with a more regionally assertive China. For more on this theme, see Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy 
Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), and his later works.
12 China’s new ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, a major commitment to much expanded infrastructure and development spending in Central and 
Southeast Asia, may (particularly via its Maritime Silk Road dimension) allow Beijing to use economic leverage to mute regional objections to its 
more assertive military posture in the South China Sea.
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successfully persuaded Beijing to normalize relations and re-establish dialogue without any 
binding commitments from the Abe administration.
There is, however, another interpretation. Since assuming power, Xi Jinping has been 
continuously engaged in strengthening the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over 
the government and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through a series of public campaigns 
against corrupt officials and generals. It has been suggested that some of Beijing’s actions, such as the 
announcement of the expansive ADIZ or the building of platforms in Vietnamese territorial waters, 
may have been conducted without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the CCP. If that is the 
case, this change in China’s policy priorities may not be a consequence of Japanese (or, for that matter, 
American) initiatives, but merely a reflection of domestic politics, and evidence that the party is 
progressively enhancing its decision-making authority and taking power away from the generals.
Arguably, it is this interpretation that explains why China dismantled its oil-rigging platform in 
the waters around Vietnam in 2014 – a very rare occurrence of the Chinese risking a loss of face 
by retreating in a struggle of wills over territory. This also explains why the PLA, while periodically 
limiting its provocative actions near the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, has nevertheless 
continued to construct runways on islands in the South China Sea where its control is much more 
secure. Here China is literally ‘digging in’ – building, in the words of one US critic, a new ‘Great 
Wall of Sand’.13 While restraining extreme provocations by the military, this time with approval from 
the Central Committee, Beijing is exerting control over these islands to demonstrate that Japan no 
longer has de facto control of them. Seen in this light, and given China’s increasing military expansion, 
a cautious improvement in diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tokyo is not necessarily a 
diplomatic victory for Japan.
Seen in the round, China’s muscular regional policy is undiminished, and any 
current or future minor improvements with Japan may represent a tactical feint 
rather than a substantive shift in the relationship.
It remains uncertain whether China is moderating its regional policy in the face of Japan’s 
hard line. At best, one should be cautious in assuming that bilateral Sino-Japanese ties are back 
on track or that Abe has necessarily been successful in promoting greater stability in the relationship. 
Seen in the round, China’s muscular regional policy is undiminished, and any current or future 
minor improvements with Japan may represent a tactical feint rather than a substantive shift in 
the relationship. It is unclear how well prepared Tokyo is, or what policy tools it may have to manage 
a potential crisis with China, or indeed what actions the US is likely to take in such circumstances. 
A key potential moderating influence in this context is the bilateral economic relationship between 
China and Japan. Recent fluctuations in the Chinese stock market and the slowdown in China’s 
economic growth may, in the view of some Japanese officials, have encouraged Xi Jinping and 
those close to him to moderate their criticism of Japan in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the 
important trade and investment benefits associated with Japanese corporate engagement with 
China. Liberal international relations specialists like to stress the stabilizing benefits of mutual 
economic dependency and its ability to reduce the likelihood of bilateral conflict, but it is probably 
premature to assume that this dynamic is a guarantee against a further deterioration in relations.
13 US Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Harry Harris quoted in BBC News, ‘China building “great wall of sand” in South China Sea’, 1 April 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32126840.
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Collective security and domestic politics
The Abe government has presented a number of bills to the parliament that allow a much wider 
remit in time of crisis for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The agenda is not only about military 
engagement when the security of Japanese territory alone is endangered, but also envisages 
security scenarios in which both Japan’s security and that of its allies and security partners 
are challenged. As Japan has maintained bilateral security agreements with the United States, 
one might imagine that this form of ‘collective security’ had already been settled, but that is 
not the case. Historically, Japan was eager to rely on US forces for its national security, but was 
extremely reluctant to aid the United States in situations where direct challenges to Japan’s security 
were absent. The US–Japan mutual security treaty of the 1960s (re-ratified and extended in 1970), 
which defines the fundamentals of the bilateral security alliance, provides for a US guarantee to 
maintain Japan’s security but does not impose a reciprocal obligation on Japan to provide material 
assistance to the United States in cases where the security of the US alone is threatened. Indeed, 
the very notion of ‘collective security’ has remained contentious and of questionable constitutional 
validity, and the new security legislation (and related interpretations) has intentionally been 
narrowly defined to encompass ‘collective self-defence’ (shudanteki kieiken). Japan’s SDF will 
in future have more flexibility to be deployed, whether independently or jointly with other nations, 
but only for purposes that are clearly related to the national security or defence of Japan broadly 
defined.14 This broader interpretation, however, now extends the defence of Japan beyond a purely 
territorial definition to encompass the security of Japanese nationals as well as access to critical 
raw materials and energy resources.
The traditional explanation for the lopsided US–Japan alliance, and the absence of any reciprocal 
obligation on the part of Japan to come to the aid of the US, was the role of pacifism and left-wing 
public opinion in postwar Japan: specifically, the majority of Japanese were firmly opposed to 
becoming entangled in a war started by the US. Fear of being sucked into a Cold War conflict, and 
the legacy of the 1930s in creating a culture of anti-militarism, have allowed the opposition parties in 
Japan to limit joint military actions with the United States, often relying on Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution, which prohibits Japan from possessing arms or military capabilities other than for 
purely defensive purposes. At the same time, public opinion polls demonstrate that some 80 per 
cent of respondents support the security treaty with the United States, so the US–Japan alliance 
per se is not contentious, provided its use is limited exclusively to safeguarding the security of Japan. 
As Paul Midford has argued,15 pacifist public opinion in Japan was actually a form of defensive 
realism that restricted Japan’s military commitments to a very circumscribed and defensive posture, 
rather than a categorical commitment to full-throated pacifism.
This defensive realism was essentially a political compromise between mainstream conservatives, 
with their desire to prioritize economic development over ambitious military expenditure, and the 
leftist opposition parties, which sought public support by positioning themselves as advocates for 
peace. Over time, however, the more hawkish, conservative LDP politicians have challenged this 
development-first priority. This constituency has long been present within the party, represented 
by figures such as former prime ministers Kishi in the 1950s or Nakasone in the 1980s. More 
14 See John Swenson-Wright, in The Role of the Nation-State in Addressing Global Challenges: Japan-UK Perspectives (London: Chatham House, 
2015), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/role-nation-state-addressing-global-challenges-japan-uk-perspectives; and John 
Swenson-Wright, ‘What Japan’s military shift means’, BBC News, 2 July 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28122791.
15 Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 
pp. 124–91.
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recently, however, they have acquired a more prominent position within the government – most 
notably in the form of Abe himself – and in the wider political establishment. To members of this 
group, the neglect of the military, a position supported by both mainstream conservatives and 
the left, had weakened Japan, in terms of military muscle and moral integrity. Reclaiming and 
re-legitimizing the role of the Japanese military, but firmly within the context of the US–Japan 
alliance, has become a paramount objective for the new conservatives in the LDP.
There are two ways to achieve this objective. One is to amend the constitution, drop Article 9 
and push for a straightforward recognition of collective security or, for that matter, the military 
itself. This was in fact the original position adopted by the new conservatives, who viewed Japan’s 
1947 constitution, drafted and adopted under the allied occupation, as too liberal. Constitutional 
amendment, however, requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament (along with 
majority support in a popular referendum), and Komeito, the coalition partner for the LDP, 
has been adamant in its opposition to such change. It was therefore quite natural for the Abe 
government to choose a second means of realizing its goal: to introduce new defence legislation 
and argue that it is constitutional.
Recently, this plan has experienced an unexpected setback. When three constitutional lawyers 
(including one recommended by the LDP) were invited to parliament in June 2015 to express 
their opinions, they unanimously agreed that the government’s proposed defence legislation 
was unconstitutional. This unexpected development has created the first major political challenge 
for Abe in pursuing his new security goals. Critics see the defence laws as a perfect symbol of 
the dangerous character of a government that, in their judgment, risks dragging Japan down 
another path to war.
The recent debate over the defence legislation has been dominated by discussions over its 
constitutionality. From the viewpoint of international relations this seems anomalous, given that 
Japan’s long-standing security relationship with the United States has, de facto, involved collective 
security cooperation, albeit within very strictly defined limits. The simple reality is that, in the event 
of a security crisis in East Asia (for example, a serious incident involving Taiwan), it is inconceivable 
that the US would not request military support from Japan, even if such support might be deemed 
unconstitutional.16 Notwithstanding this closer alignment with the US, the Abe government’s claim 
that these laws will strengthen deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China is questionable, since Beijing 
must have long assumed that Japan will join hands with the US in time of war, irrespective of the 
constitutional limitations. Even setting aside the legality of the new legislation, its actual effect 
on the behaviour of potential adversaries is uncertain. Its merit lies less in enhancing deterrence 
than in providing the Japanese government with greater flexibility to respond swiftly to a future 
security crisis, and in closer cooperation with the United States. What is uncertain is whether this 
new flexibility will heighten the risk of creeping, unintentional and unanticipated involvement 
by Japan in future conflicts outside its traditional remit of self-protection.
It is doubtful if the Abe administration would be willing to lead the country into another regional 
conflict, and Abe himself has been careful to state repeatedly that the new legislation will not allow 
Japan to declare war. The government’s approach is a minimalist and restricted one. Strengthening 
alliance commitments is, after all, a natural response to Chinese military advances in maritime 
16 The recently agreed new US–Japan Joint Defense Guidelines provide scope for a much more active cooperative relationship between the 
militaries of the two countries, involving joint operations and coordination in a variety of security scenarios.
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Asia. Nevertheless, there is no question that it has challenged Japan’s long tradition of low-profile 
defence policy. Pacifism has been the foundation of the country’s postwar de facto isolationism, 
limiting overseas military involvement and, at least in the minds of the Japanese public, keeping it 
safe from involvement in conflict. The government, by testing the envelope of Japan’s security risk 
aversion, by moving beyond the cautious position of its early days, and through the prime minister’s 
own more assertive position, has entered new and uncharted political waters at home and abroad 
that may undermine its stability.
The government, by testing the envelope of Japan’s security risk aversion, 
by moving beyond the cautious position of its early days, and through the prime 
minister’s own more assertive position, has entered new and uncharted political 
waters at home and abroad that may undermine its stability.
The prime minister’s popularity has dipped strikingly (support for the Abe cabinet was just 37 per cent 
in July 2015, according to an Asahi poll17) in the face of debates within the Diet over the government’s 
new security legislation, and it remains unclear whether the government has succeeded in convincing 
public opinion that the new measures are essential to protect Japan. Indeed, given that the new 
interpretation of collective self-defence has materially increased the likelihood that Japan’s SDF will 
at some point be involved in a wider set of as yet unspecified conflicts, a risk-averse Japanese public 
may become increasingly nervous, if not actively hostile to the government’s approach. Moreover, the 
suspicion, highlighted by members of the opposition parties, that the security reforms are a back-door 
form of de facto revision of the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty and also the thin end of the wedge in 
terms of a more deliberate effort at wide-ranging constitutional revision, encompassing a whole range 
of sensitive political as well as strategic issues, may expose the government to further public criticism 
and resistance.
The future of the alliance
For the US, Japan’s acceptance of the principle of collective self-defence and the strengthening of the 
alliance was supposed to be a positive and welcome development. Cumulatively, over time, Japan’s 
constitutional limitations on the deployment of Japanese military forces have imposed significant 
strains on the alliance; Japan, unlike South Korea or Australia, could not be expected to provide full 
and uncompromising support. Such an unbalanced alliance has risked generating a backlash in the 
US – if not among the general public, then at least within Congress. As Japan discovered to its cost 
during the first Gulf war in 1990, the perception that it might be unwilling to provide full support to 
an internationally sanctioned security initiative has sometimes exposed the country to sharp criticism 
for doing too little too late or for being a fair-weather alliance partner. 
Furthermore, the new defence laws went hand in hand with the so-called pivot to Asia, or the 
rebalancing strategy of the United States. This strategy identifies China as a potential threat in the 
region, but the degree to which Washington, despite the rhetoric, is willing to commit itself in terms 
of military capabilities remains unclear. This is especially the case since instability in the Middle East 
and North Africa, as well as deteriorating relations with Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, 
17 ‘Asahi poll: support for Abe cabinet drops to 37%; 57% oppose security bills’, Asahi Shimbun, 20 July 2015, https://ajw.asahi.com/article/
behind_news/politics/AJ201507200028.
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have raised questions about Washington’s ability to mobilize sufficient resources in the event of an 
East Asian conflict. The solution to this potential crisis has been to request further cooperation from 
US allies, which will strengthen deterrence capabilities without imposing new strains on US forces. 
No wonder the Pentagon has greeted Japan’s initiative as a long overdue enhanced commitment 
to the alliance and correction of an anomalous situation.
In contrast to the Pentagon, the US State Department has been more muted in its response to 
Japan’s new defence proactivism.18 This is curious given that an enhanced Japanese military role 
has been a US objective since the early 1950s. The explanation lies in the risk aversion of some 
planners in Washington and the potential for instability and military escalation in East Asia. 
They fear that the US may become reluctantly entangled in a regional conflict by chance rather than 
design. Consider a situation where Chinese and Japanese forces exchange fire over the control of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – not an implausible scenario given the recent marked increase in maritime 
and air incursions by Chinese forces into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the islands. President 
Barack Obama has made clear that the US stands by its Article V commitments in the US–Japan 
Security Treaty to defend Japan’s administrative rights over the islands, even though it does not 
take a view on legal arguments underpinning the competing sovereignty claims associated with the 
territory. If Washington were not to send forces in support of Japan in the event of a conflict over 
the islands, the credibility of its alliance relations would be endangered not only in Japan but on a 
global scale. If, on the other hand, the US chooses to engage, then it risks being sucked into a possible 
full-blown conflict with China. The irony here is that it is now the US, and not Japan, that is afraid 
of entanglement – a stark reversal of the pattern of the past. Washington remains committed 
to deterring China (judging from its continuing resolve to station troops in Asia and the public 
statements of senior US military officials), but it appears to have a declining appetite for conflict. 
As a consequence, the credibility of its security posture may be at risk.
An additional factor that may be dimming Washington’s enthusiasm for the partnership is the 
recent increase in tension between South Korea and Japan. Bilateral ties between Seoul and Tokyo 
were already bad in the days of President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Noda, when talks over 
the controversial issue of comfort women broke down, prompting Lee to make the first visit by a 
serving South Korean president to the Takeshima/Dokdo islands, which are under Korean control 
but claimed by Japan. Lee’s successor, President Park Geun-hye, has adopted an even tougher line, 
refusing to agree to a formal bilateral summit with Abe if Japan fails to take action on the comfort 
women question. For Park, the core issue appears to be one of trust, or rather the lack of it. The 
impression is that the South Korean president has lost faith in the ability of the Japanese political 
establishment, or at least key members of the Abe government, to make a genuine commitment to 
address contentious historical issues. It is not enough, according to the Korean side, for Abe simply 
to express his support for the Kono statement; Japan needs to do more to demonstrate its sincere 
and official commitment to compensate the few surviving Korean comfort women for past human 
rights abuses. Abe also needs to be scrupulous in avoiding any impression, however small, that he 
may tacitly or indirectly be sympathetic to those conservative voices at home that contest the value 
or legitimacy of the Kono statement. Deteriorating relations between Washington’s two key regional 
allies, South Korea and Japan, have considerably weakened its strategic position in East Asia and 
are a source of intense frustration to US diplomats, who have become increasingly vocal in arguing 
that these contentious historical issues need to be resolved. Against this background, there are limits 
18 Ascertained through interviews in New York in May 2015.
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to the lengths to which the US will go in offering carte blanche support to the Abe government. 
There is no doubt that in Washington, Abe is seen as a more attractive and effective leader than 
his predecessor Hatoyama, but this does not mean that Japan’s relations with the United States 
are stable or immune to disruption and uncertainty.
History, war memories and the Abe administration
Despite its international prominence, the controversy over history has less traction domestically 
in Japan. Although Japanese progressive critics have accused Abe of being a revisionist, they have 
concentrated more on his security reforms and his preference for constitutional amendment. By 
contrast, the image of Abe as a historical revisionist who wishes to turn the clock back to the 1930s 
and who has not accepted Japan’s responsibilities for the excesses of the colonial period and the 
Pacific war is popular not only in South Korea and China but also in certain quarters in the US 
and Europe. When Abe took office in 2012, the international press underlined its concern that 
a revisionist had assumed power in Japan;19 Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in 2013 was another occasion 
to revive that concern.
A close reading of Abe’s public statements reveals a more nuanced picture. He has, in fact, been 
extremely careful to avoid making references to Japan’s role in the Second World War or its colonial 
rule in the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. In his public statements abroad, he has consistently referred 
to modern Japan as a peace-loving nation that has learned the lessons from and atoned for its 
past mistakes:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, when we Japanese started out again after the Second World War, we thought 
long and hard over what had happened in the past, and came to make a vow for peace with their [sic] 
whole hearts. We Japanese have followed that path until the present day. We will never let the horrors 
of the past century’s history repeat themselves. This vow that Japan made after the war is still fully alive 
today. It will never change going forward. There is no question at all about this point.
Yes, our countries both love peace. We value freedom and democracy. And we hold human rights and the 
rule of law dear.20
At home, Abe has repeatedly stressed that he endorses and adheres to both the Kono and Murayama 
statements, and echoed this once again in his official statement in August 2015 to commemorate the 
70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific war. However, in the run-up to the issue of the statement, 
there had been speculation that it might involve some modification of the original language from 
1995. Speculation such as this, that once solid declarations may be open to reinterpretation, has 
provided ammunition for critics who want to accuse the government of harbouring revisionist 
sentiments. Such claims are given added weight by the inclusion in the current cabinet of members 
or former members of Nippon Kaigi, a conservative lobbying group that has been at the forefront 
of claims that Japanese history textbooks have embraced an overly apologetic, masochistic view 
of the past and are too dominated by progressive opinion.
Unpacking Abe’s personal views on the history question is a difficult and inconclusive process. 
Judged purely in terms of his public statements, there is no conclusive evidence that he is a historical 
19 See, for example, ‘Shinzo Abe must resist dangerous distractions’, Financial Times, 28 April 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc6d09a4-ae76-
11e2-bdfd-00144feabdc0.html; ‘Another attempt to deny Japan’s history’, New York Times, 2 January 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/
opinion/another-attempt-to-deny-japans-history.html.
20 ‘Remarks by Prime Minister Abe to the Australian Parliament’, 8 July 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0708article1.html.
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revisionist. Like any national leader who engages with sensitive historical issues, he needs to be 
assessed in the round, with appropriate consideration of his actual policies and his public statements 
– and, importantly, of what is omitted from as well as included in official publications. Similarly, 
gestures of reconciliation, whether directed at the world or the East Asian region, or at specific former 
adversaries, are an important barometer of sentiment, reflecting the views not just of the prime 
minister himself but also, very significantly, of the country he represents.
It is important, however, to distinguish between the spirit and the letter of the law when it comes to 
history. Unlike Koizumi, who maintained his distance from conservative movements, Abe has been 
indirectly associated with a variety of campaigns that are at the heart of Japan’s increasingly fractious 
debate over identity politics. Whether over history textbooks, the status of the Japanese flag and 
national anthem, the legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal in adjudicating Japan’s war crimes, or the role 
of public broadcasters such as NHK (the national television network) in reporting the past, Abe has 
been viewed, rightly or wrongly, as instinctively sympathetic to a conservative position. The danger 
is that he risks being pigeonholed as having a rigidly doctrinaire position that is tantamount to 
revisionism; alternatively, he risks being perceived as disingenuous and harbouring a private position 
that is much more hardline than his public statements. If the LDP wishes to avoid courting further 
controversy in a way that will undermine its authority and potentially jeopardize its ability to stay in 
power, Abe must refrain from any comments that could be interpreted as historical revisionism. Tone 
and nuance in this context are as important as the actual text of individual speeches, and he should be 
careful to avoid taking refuge in syntactical subterfuge or an excessively pedantic referencing of past 
statements as a way of demonstrating his non-revisionist bona fides.
If the Abe government wishes to stay in power, the only choice is to maintain its pragmatic foreign 
policy posture and avoid any statements that could potentially be interpreted as an endorsement 
of Japan’s past wartime actions. This type of pragmatic approach was very much at the heart 
of the prime minister’s first year in office, notwithstanding the controversy generated abroad 
by his Yasukuni visit.
Abe’s position became even more entrenched in his second year. With a strong cabinet and economic 
recovery, the LDP won a landslide victory following a snap election in late 2014.21 In the Diet, the 
LDP has a robust majority, and no opposition party is in a position to seriously challenge it in either 
the lower or the upper house. Within the LDP, moreover, there are no factions able to challenge the 
Seiwakai, and no major contenders for the office of the prime minister. Neither Nakasone nor Koizumi 
– two key examples of strong and effective prime ministerial leadership – enjoyed such a strong 
position in Japanese politics. In this regard, Abe is arguably uniquely placed to push forward with 
his more decisive foreign policy agenda.
Of course, it is often at the time of maximum strength that politicians need to guard against one 
of their most dangerous opponents – namely, hubris. In the absence of political challenges at home, 
Abe may overreach by pushing too far and too fast to promote his security agenda without carrying 
public opinion with him. The current dramatic explosion of popular demonstrations against the 
government’s security legislation, and the opposition boycott of Diet proceedings in protest at the 
government’s allegedly nonconsensual and ‘undemocratic’ forcing through of key legislation through 
committee, are distant echoes of the historical controversy that dominated Diet debates during the 
final years of the Kishi government in 1960. It would be a particularly ironic development if Abe, 
21 Abe called the election to secure support for his economic reforms.
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who, by his own admission, deeply admired Kishi from a very young age, suffered the same political 
fate as his grandfather. Kishi, it should be remembered, successfully secured the passage of the 
revised US–Japan security treaty – a reform that was in essence a pragmatic early example of Japan’s 
emerging foreign and security proactivism – only to find himself forced out of office, having lost the 
support of members of his own party and that of the general public. Politics is a fickle business, one 
that does not always reward brave and far-sighted leaders.
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